Introduction
Further to this, and looking specifically at the near-repeat phenomenon, there are two main hypotheses proposed to explain why this pattern occurs: near repeat as a consequence of a contagion effect (Townsley et al 2003) or as a function of offenders operating as optimal foragers (Bowers and Johnson, 2004) . The contagion effect (Townsley et al 2003) was proposed following a study that analyzed data from a 34-month period from a high-crime area of Brisbane, Australia. This study determined that a higher than expected rate of burglaries occurred to properties near a recent target and that this may be even more evident if an area has a high offender population (Townsley et al 2003) . It was proposed that, if an area was vulnerable, such as those areas with high crime rates, many properties may already be 'infected', further increasing the likelihood of victimization contagion (Townsley et al 2003) . Bowers and Johnson (2004) proposed an alternative framework by which near-repeat burglary victimization occurs by viewing offenders as optimal foragers.
According to this perspective, offenders make 'trade-offs' between what rewards are immediately and obviously available and what efforts are needed to 'forage' for rewards in other areas. Offenders select neighborhoods and properties where foraging will require little effort and will offer valuable rewards. The optimal foraging account predicts that to maximize their potential for reward, offenders target whole neighborhoods and not just one property. Furthermore, rather than accessing areas in which they have had little success, offenders are likely to forage in areas where they have had prior success (Bernasco et al 2015) . Offenders will continue to commit crimes in optimal locations for as long as they are rewarded and when rewards have been exhausted, they will move on to forage in other locations (Chainey and da Silva, 2016) .
To summarize, offenders select properties in areas they know and go to anyway, they make rational decisions to offend against suitable properties ('flagged') and properties they have successfully offended against before ('boosted'), and they seek out targets near to properties that they have previously targeted. The following section connects these theories to evidence indicating it is possible to use the nonrandomness of victimization risk to implement successful targeted crime prevention interventions.
Reducing opportunities for burglary does prevent subsequent crime
Offenders will continue to commit crimes in optimal locations for as long as there are opportunities to do so (Chainey and da Silva, 2016) . To avoid a repeat or near repeat burglary, prior targets and potential opportunities need to be modified in such a way that the risk and effort are higher than the reward (Farrell and Pease 2003; Grover et al 2012; Sutton et al 2014) . This approach is consistent with the 25 techniques of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 2009), which have been previously implemented to successfully achieve a wide-range of crime prevention goals.
For example, the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention project (Forrester et al 1988) is recognized as having made a distinctive contribution in the fight against domestic burglary by its implementation of situational crime prevention techniques (Farrell and Pease, 1993) . A crime evaluation of the Kirkholt estate found most burglaries were committed by local individuals, with the primary form of burglary being money taken from coin-operated gas and electricity pre-payment meters. To hinder this theft opportunity token-fed meters were introduced (Forrester et al 1988) . Significant upgrades were made to residential properties, including the installation of alarms and more effective locks and improved lighting. Target hardening techniques were used to better address the estate's high levels of residential burglaries (Forrester et al 1988) . These techniques resulted in a 60% drop in domestic burglaries within five months, and after five years, the estate recorded a 75% decrease in the number of burglaries (Forrester et al 1988) .
With the purpose of altering the perceived risk, reward, and effort of offending in targeted areas, Bennett et al (2006) evaluated 18 high-quality neighborhood watch schemes with elements that included neighborhood watch, property marking and surveys in levels of residential security. Results indicated that 15 of the 18 studies suggested neighborhood watch schemes reduced crime with increased levels of guardianship resulting in a 16% reduction in crime in areas where neighborhood watch schemes were implemented.
Law enforcement agencies have also been involved in efforts to stave off future burglaries and to reduce the number of repeat and near repeat victimizations.
For example, police in Huddersfield, West Yorkshire, initiated the 'Biting Back' scheme based on repeat victimization studies to address repeat burglary and motor vehicle theft (Anderson et al 1995) . The project involved bringing together police, local government, Victim Support, and Huddersfield University. As the project's leading agency, police officers set about visiting properties that had been the victim of two or more burglaries within a 12-month period. Police officers were required to inform victims that an offender was likely to return and also to inform neighbors when and where a burglary had already occurred (Chenery et al 2002) . After informing victims and neighbors of the increase in risk, neighbors were asked to look out for any suspicious activity, especially activity involving the victim's premises (Chenery et al 2002) . Reported data from the project indicates that during the first nine months of operation there was a 24% reduction in residential burglary, which was attributed to a reduction in the number of repeat burglaries and a 5% reduction in other burglaries (Pease and Laycock, 1999) . Further, cocoon watch lead to an increase in the installation of security alarms by neighbors with installations increasing from 4% to 14%. Data indicated that there had also been an increase in the number of arrests (Anderson et al 1995) . These results indicate the 'Biting Back' program was successful in its approach to repeat burglary victimization.
In another police-led intervention, the Greater Manchester Police, UK, used predictive risk mapping to disrupt optimal foragers with a view to reducing domestic burglary (Fielding and Jones 2012) . This intervention involved directing patrols to 400 m buffer zones that surrounded domestic burglary locations in Trafford, with a focus on the three weeks after the burglary event (and using a four-color system to reflect diminishing risk over time). The intent of this design was to allow front-line police to implement a theory-based intervention that was manageable and achievable within financial and resource constraints. The police (and other local partner agencies, including fire services) were instructed to provide additional capable guardianship in buffer zones at high-risk times. Following a 12 month trial, domestic burglaries in the trial areas had declined by 27 percent (relative to the previous year), with the reduction outperforming the majority of similar policing areas within Manchester and the general national burglary trends in the UK. Rather than households, area was used as the unit of analysis and the study involved a total of 46 neighborhoods, randomly selected and allocated to either a treatment or a control group. Victims and neighbors in treatment areas were allocated inexpensive target-hardening measures and were given burglary advice from police officers. Residences within controlled areas received no treatment and officers were instructed to carry out their usual business. When a burglary occurred within the treatment area, the victimized property and eight immediate neighbors received burglary advice from police, as well as packages containing and explaining simple target-hardening measures. Johnson et al (2017) found that while residents in high crime areas did not experience a reduction in risk that could be considered significant, residents in low crime areas did show a marginally visible effect and neighbors of targeted properties who did receive intervention and who did live in lower-crime areas, did experience a reduction in risk that could be considered significant. Overall, treatment areas experienced a reduction in crime and Johnson et al (2017) concluded that whilst the findings are small and lack consistent statistical significance, it is reasonable to conclude that either the target-hardening measures or the advice received from police did produce the results identified in the study.
Aims and expectations of the evaluation
In aggregate, there are strong empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that residential burglary in Western Australia is likely to cluster in a non-random way across time and space, with an elevated risk of repeat and near-repeat burglaries in the period of time immediately after an initial attack. It is also to be expected that targeted interventions designed to reduce future suitability of previously targeted properties should reduce the opportunity they pose for motivated offenders. Given the researchers commenced this program evaluation after it had been delivered by the WA Police, the high-level expectations were that, by promoting crime prevention strategies, increasing guardianship, encouraging reporting, and giving advice about effective residential interventions, the WA Police cocooning initiative should prevent subsequent residential burglary. The next section explains what the WA Police pilot intervention involved, the post-hoc evaluation methodology that was implemented, and summarizes the main datasets that were utilized.
Data and methodology

WA Police cocooning pilot initiative
The cocooning pilot initiative was designed and implemented by the WA Police, with the pilot running in a northern suburb police jurisdiction of the Perth metropolitan area. Police commenced trialing this intervention in May 2016 and by November 2016 the intervention was fully underway with all residential burglary victims initiating a cocooning response. The cocooning program involved the distribution of an information pamphlet in the immediate aftermath to a residential burglary. Suburban Perth has relatively sparse housing density, which influenced the number of properties that were targeted for cocooning following each residential burglary. The pamphlet was distributed (by a combination of mail and in-person visits from police) to victims and the houses immediately surrounding the victim's property (typically about 8 cocooned houses per victim address) within 48 hours of the burglary event. The pamphlet contained crime prevention information, advised residents how to conduct a home security audit, and listed important contact information for victims and witnesses (e.g., for police assistance and Crime Stoppers). The WA Police maintained records about which addresses were contacted (as victims and near-by properties), the date of contact, and the method of contact.
Post-implementation evaluation framework
As this research was developed after the fact, it was not possible to create a matched sample randomized controlled trial. Instead, the evaluation used three available measures with a view to triangulating the findings across datasets. First, Ratcliffe's (2009) near repeat calculator (NRC) was used to examine the relative rates of near (in time and space) residential burglaries before and after the implementation of the cocooning program. Second, a process analysis of the properties contacted by WA Police with burglary information was undertaken to ensure the cocooning initiative was delivered in the manner proposed by police.
Third, a voluntary survey involving residents was administered aimed at examining behavioral changes as a result of receiving the burglary pamphlet. If the data showed a reduction in burglaries during the trial period using the NRC, this evaluation design would help establish whether these reductions could be attributed to the cocooning program.
Near-repeat calculations
The NRC reviewed residential burglary victimization pre-April 2016 (the preinitiative period) and reported burglaries from November 2016 to June 2017 (the period when the cocooning initiative was fully operational). The NRC has been implemented in prior research on repeat and near repeat victimizations (e.g., Chainey and da Silva's (2016) study recently used the NRC to explore the extent of repeat and near repeat victimization of domestic burglaries in Belo Horizonte, Brazil).
This study implemented the NRC to examine the 'distance and time between burglaries' to determine if a statistically significant pattern of near repeat victimizations was evident. Using Ratcliffe's NRC, spatial and temporal parameters were set at five days and 50 m, with ten bands each, using Euclidean distance calculations and 1,000 iterations (p = 0.001). These parameters are specific to the geography of residential suburbs in Perth but are consistent with those used in other areas (Moreto et al 2014; Youstin et al 2011) . Data clean-up required attributing a geolocation coordinate to each point; converting the coordinates to meters (MGA50) from degrees, minutes, and seconds; excluding locations where the burgled address could not be attributed to a specific dwelling; and excluding duplicated offences for one incident number. The researchers provided guidance around the parameters of this NRC implementation, but the data involved was retained by the WA Police at all times.
Process evaluation data
The process evaluation was undertaken by examining the records that had been compiled relating to which dwellings had received the cocooning intervention.
The WA Police provided the researchers with data containing a unique address identifier (acquired from Landgate, https://www0.landgate.wa.gov.au/), an incident report number, a unique identifier for addresses following the WA Police incident management system, addresses that received a burglary alert pamphlet by post or in person, the date cocooning occurred, and the suburb of the unique address. Data also included the name of the targeted suburb, the date of victimization, the date pamphlets were sent to residents, and the number of times pamphlets were sent.
Behavioral change survey of residents
The residents' survey sought information on how residents respond to the cocooning crime prevention information and specifically, whether their behavior had changed as a result of receiving the information. To contact residents a letter was mailed by the WA Police explaining that, in conjunction with a local university, the police were evaluating the effectiveness of the cocooning initiative. Letters were sent 
Results
This analysis outlines the findings from each of these three lines of information. First, NRC results are discussed, followed by the process analysis, and then the main results from the online survey are outlined.
The pseudo-p-value results of the NRC analysis prior to implementation of the cocooning project show that in the pre-implementation period there is evidence of an elevated near-repeat risk of burglary (all significant, meaningful repeat victimization patterns shaded grey in Table 1 ). There was evidence of a sameaddress repeat victimization pattern within 0 to 5 days, with the chance of another incident during this time window about 505% greater than if there was no repeat victimization pattern. Within this temporal band there was also a significant nearrepeat risk, with over-representation of burglaries from 1 m to 200 m within 5 days of the initial residential burglary. These findings provide additional empirical support for undertaking the cocooning initiative in the first instance.
In comparison, the pattern of near repeat victimizations after the implementation of the cocooning project showed some very interesting changes (Table 2 , with all significant, meaningful repeat victimization patterns shaded grey).
As before the intervention, there was evidence of a same-address repeat victimization pattern within 0 to 5 days, with the chance of another incident during this time window about 754% greater than if there was no repeat victimization pattern. In contrast to this, however, there was no post-intervention indication that there was a near-repeat victimization issue. From this it can be concluded that near repeat victimizations declined relative to the pre-intervention period but surprisingly, the risk of same address victimizations did not.
The next stage of the analysis was to examine the WA Police process data to explore how the program was delivered and to examine possible reasons for the failure to reduce the risk of same-address repeat burglaries. Table 1 approximately here   Inset Table 2 approximately here during the cocooning initiative (near-repeat rate of 1.5%). As a result of this initiative, the policing sub-district saw a significant drop in the likelihood that nearby houses would be targeted following an initial burglary. It is estimated that this police activity prevented roughly seven victims of burglary in this area (assuming a constant pattern of 4.3% near repeats without police intervention).
Given the NRC results, it does appear likely that the cocooning had influenced victimization in the area, so it was essential to look at how frequently properties received this information. Using police records, the process by which the cocooning information was distributed to victims and surrounding houses was also examined.
There was evidence of properties receiving the cocooning information on multiple occasions, with 1,286 properties contacted once, 67 properties contacted twice, and 11 properties contacted three times. A subset of 68 properties had been both victims and recipients of cocooning information (because of near-by burglary victimization).
Only 11 of this subset received the cocooning information prior to burglary victimization. Crucially, and with immediate relevance to the failure to reduce sameaddress repeat burglaries, this process analysis also revealed a significant issue in providing burglary victims with the cocooning information. Of the 238 victimized properties, only 23.2% were recorded as having been provided with the burglary prevention information, meaning that over three-quarters of victims were left untreated.
This process analysis information was significant for the WA Police for a number of reasons. First, as a result of their data recording practices, they were unaware that they were contacting properties on more than one occasion or that there were repeat victims. Also, WA Police did not deliver the cocooning information Inset Figure 1 approximately here to over 75% of the addresses that had experienced burglary, and finally, for the subset of properties that were victims and cocooned, most of them received the cocooning information after they were victimized as a result of a nearby burglary.
The final part of this triangulated analysis was to see whether residents who did receive the cocooning treatment changed their behavior as a result of the prevention-focused, timely information. The NRC results discussed above (Table 2) give good reason to believe there was a positive effect of the intervention, but it was necessary to try and establish what behavioral changes were put in to affect.
Given the post-hoc nature of the evaluation in this instance, participation in the behavioral change survey was dependent on a number of factors beyond the researchers' control. Unfortunately, the response rate was very low, with only 35 respondents choosing to participate (roughly 2.2%). Whilst disappointing, this was not surprising: using a similar method, Haberman et al (2016) had a survey response rate of roughly 9%, and not all individuals may wish to participate in online surveys, due to confidentiality concerns (Sax et al 2003) . As such, the findings of the survey are presented to provide context to the earlier results, but the researchers are aware of the limitations to this sample and caution against drawing definitive conclusions based on this data source in isolation.
Of the 35 survey responses, 20 respondents remember receiving the cocooning information, with three of the 20 receiving the pamphlet more than once.
Fifteen respondents did not remember receiving the pamphlet. Eighteen respondents read the pamphlet, and nine utilized the recommended safety checklist. Of those nine respondents, all had windows with key-locks or other security devices; eight had solid core doors; seven keep trees and shrubs trimmed, had well-lit entrances, and kept the garage or shed locked; and five had automatic light timers or sensor lights, and alarms. Seven of the nine respondents did not have a peephole in their door or keep their meter box locked. Five respondents did not keep a telephone or mobile in the bedroom with emergency numbers nor have contents and valuables engraved or marked for identification.
Other insight into behavioral change implemented as a result of the cocooning information showed that 13 of the respondents did make security changes as a result of receiving the pamphlet. Most commonly, respondents indicated they would now keep houses locked when they were home and they had subsequently installed security screens and/or deadlocks on windows and external doors. Reasons given for not implementing risk reduction strategies included: (a) residents believed the current approach to security and risk reduction was adequate, (b) financial restrictions prevented implementing changes, (c) changes had already been made based upon other WA Police information, and (d) skepticism about the information in the pamphlet and the belief that there was no increased level of risk. Overall, although there was a small response to the survey, the best estimate for those who did reply is that, when the cocooning pamphlet was read, it did have some influence on protective behaviors. These findings are consistent with the reduction in nearrepeat burglary frequencies discussed above.
Discussion
To summarize, this evaluation gives additional support to the position that police can use victimization information to work in a targeted, timely manner and reduce the risk of burglary. This cocooning initiative does seem to have influenced residents' behaviors and reduced the frequency of near-repeat residential burglaries.
That said, the effectiveness of the intervention was limited by the information management practices and the failure to communicate with burglary victims in all cases. The theoretical and applied implications of these results are discussed below, followed by an overview of the limitations to this study and some consideration for future research directions that build on this foundation.
Implications of these findings
Building on what is known about the non-randomness of crime across time and space, the elevated risk of repeat and near-repeat burglary for a short period of time after an initial burglary event, and the capacity to alter the opportunity for burglary to occur by reducing the suitability of potential targets, the successes resulting from this police-led pilot intervention are to be expected. From a practical perspective, this was a low-cost police intervention that returned a positive crime prevention outcome. Building on this success, it may be possible to consider the benefits of partnership to sustain this program, with ongoing cocooning activity 'outsourced' (for example to local government crime and safety officers, private security, and/or interested not-for-profit groups). The working together of police and security providers is considered an integral part of a law enforcement approach that seeks to prevent crime (Casey and Mitchell, 2007) . Crime prevention is now considered a community-wide issue and the notion that it is the sole responsibility of police is being re-examined (Golsby, 1998) . It may also be beneficial to examine the cultural attitude toward burglary within the police force, to ensure the successful implementation of cocooning as a crime prevention tool. Reinforcing the importance of practical data collection procedures and the importance of providing victims with up-to-date burglary information will also help contribute to the success of future cocooning initiatives.
Limitations and future research
Despite the findings that cocooning does have a positive effect on the number of repeat victimizations there are limitations to the method used in this study. It is likely that the risk of repeat burglaries at same location addresses would have been reduced had police distributed the pamphlet to victims of an initial event, as the receipt of the pamphlet may have resulted in residents incorporating the security list recommendations into current security measures. Also, from a police perspective, while the initiative was undertaken there was no systematic approach to look for repeat addresses (victims and/or cocooned near properties). Awareness of these repeats, which are to be expected based on prior research findings, would have allowed the WA Police to consider other measures that could have been implemented to support multiple victims. Further, survey data indicated that 15 respondents did not remember receiving a burglary alert pamphlet and some of these respondents may have been victimized but not contacted. From police data we know that this is the case. Finally, residents may have received a copy of the pamphlet, but the mail/pamphlet delivery model is imperfect, as the pamphlet can be mistaken for marketing material, which can see it discarded without being read.
Moving forward, it is essential that future similar pilot exercises design the evaluation framework prior to implementing the intervention. This would ensure the likelihood of gathering behavioral change information is maximized, data management would identify repeat victims/cocooning addresses, and the overlap between the victims/cocooned addresses would be highlighted. Building on this, it would also be possible to implement a tiered prevention response, based on the frequency of previous victimization, such that second and subsequent victimization incidents trigger a more intensive targeted intervention to reduce the suitability of that highly victimized location. If this approach is adopted, it would also be necessary to increase police understanding of why these types of prevention interventions are implemented. Previous research has demonstrated that the engagement of police in crime prevention programs is an important factor in their success. For example, a burglary prevention study conducted in the United Kingdom that required police officers to carry out a security survey at a burglarized address and to then pass the completed survey on to local crime reduction officers found implementation failures, with only some officers completing the survey conscientiously (Farrell and Pease, 1993) . Other officers showed disdain for the process and did not engage in carrying out security surveys (Farrell and Pease, 1993) . Although this intervention did ultimately demonstrate a 33% reduction in repeat burglaries, the lack of holistic support by police limited the program's effectiveness (Farrell and Pease, 1993) .
There was no indication that officers involved in the current pilot were reluctant participants, but this is an issue to remain cognizant of when developing a prevention-focused approach to managing police problems. It is also worth noting the lessons that can be learned from the failed attempts to replicate the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project (Tilley 1993) and the importance of acknowledging the context of success prior to undertaking replications.
Conclusion
The implementation of the cocooning initiative undertaken by the WA Police did reduce the risk of burglary victimization. Even though not all victims received the burglary alert pamphlet and though not all residents engaged in behavioral change, the risk of burglary victimization did reduce. The level at which the number of repeat and near repeat burglaries is reduced is influenced by the tactics and standards Number of victimization events per property 
